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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
There is no direct mention of public education in the United States Constitution.  
Throughout American history, issues surrounding education have largely been left for 
individual states to decide.  In 49 states, there is a clause in the state constitution to 
“establish and maintain” a system of public schools (Ziebarth, 2000).  In most states, 
schools are financed by a combination of federal aid, state aid, and local funds.  
According to the National Center for Education Statistics, about 8.5% of school revenues 
came from the federal government in fiscal year 2007 (Zhou, 2009).  The remaining 
revenues came from the state (47.6%) and local sources (43.9%). The localized portion of 
school funds is often obtained through property taxes; hence, some “property rich” 
districts are able to finance education at higher levels than “property poor” districts.  
In the United States, most students attend school in the district where they reside.  
According to Orfield and Lee (2005), the average White student attends a school that is 
79% White, while the average Black student attends a school that is 53.8% Black. 
Eighty-eight percent of schools that are less than 10% White have a majority of students 
receiving free or reduced price lunch, while the concentration of poor students is much 
lower in schools that are predominately White (Orfield and Lee, 2005).  Massey and 
Denton note, “…because poverty is associated with poor educational performance 
segregation also concentrates educational disadvantage” (1993, 141).  As students 
progress through the education system, the differences in scores between students of 
different socioeconomic backgrounds widen (Walberg, 2001).  Card and Kruger (1992a) 
demonstrate that decreases in the Black-White wage differential can be attributed to 
improvements in quality of predominantly Black schools.  If poor and minority students 
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do not receive a quality education, they will be unable to achieve the same job 
opportunities as students from wealthy neighborhoods.   
School finance reform aims to reduce the funding disparities between rich and 
poor districts and reduce the achievement gap between students from low-income and 
wealthy neighborhoods.  If low test scores and high dropout rates among minority 
students are a function of underfunded schools, increased state aid should lead to school 
spending and student outcomes that are not correlated with median household income in 
the district.  State funding for education is generated through state taxes, which include 
revenues from across the state, unlike property taxes that are solely dependent on local 
characteristics.  States can give more aid to poorer schools by introducing new state taxes 
and use the revenues for education spending or by redirecting existing tax revenue 
streams that were originally designated for other policy areas toward education.  States 
can also redistribute education spending so that aid is diverted from richer schools to 
poorer schools (Paris, 2010).   
  Earlier studies of school finance reform have looked at the effects of court 
ordered reform from the 1970s and 1980s.  However, there have been many changes in 
school finance equalization since that time.  In a study by Card and Payne (2002), 21 of 
the 48 mainland states had no court decision by 1992.  By 2000, however, only seven 
states had not had court decisions regarding school finance.  Additionally, many states 
with court decisions before 1992 had subsequent decisions that led to a change in the 
state’s system of financing education. This paper examines the outcomes resulting from 
the court-ordered school finance reforms of the 1990s, by looking at changes in the 
relationship between median income and district expenditures and income and state aid 
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from 1990 to 2000.  The goal is to test whether those states that changed their funding 
schemes have experienced a change in the relationship between median income in a 
district and per pupil expenditures, as well as the relationship between district median 
income and the amount of state aid received.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Models of School Finance Equalization at the State Level 
  Berne and Stieffel define wealth neutrality in school finance as the idea that, “no 
relationship should exist between the education of children and the property wealth (or 
other fiscal capacity) that supports the public funding of that education” (1999, 16).  
Assuming a constant level of state aid, taxpayers in a property poor district would have to 
pay higher taxes to generate the same amount of revenues for schools as those in districts 
with higher property wealth.  Proponents of school finance reform argue that the state 
must distribute aid in such a way that those districts that cannot raise money through 
property taxes can engage in the same levels of per-pupil expenditures as property-rich 
districts.  Figure 1 (Sipple, 2009) is a basic representation of the concept of equalizing 
aid.  In this example, each district receives an equal amount of Foundation Aid, 
represented by the bottom rectangle.  Foundation Aid is a baseline amount of funding 
given to each district, regardless of district characteristics.  The lower triangle represents 
the amount that districts are able to raise through local property taxes.  If these were the 
only two sources of funding, wealthy districts would have much more available funding 
than poorer districts.  However, with perfectly equalizing aid, represented by the top 
triangle, all districts have the same amount of funding regardless of wealth.     
States’ methods for determining foundation and equalizing aid differ.  Card and 
Payne (2002) classify school finance systems into three different categories: Flat Grant 
formulas (FG), Minimum Foundation Plans (MFP), and Variable Grant formulas (VG).  
Under the flat grant system, each school district receives a fixed grant per student from 
the state.  Flat grant systems have no effect on equality, as each district receives the same 
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funding regardless of characteristics such as student poverty, race, or socioeconomic 
status (Card and Payne, 2002).  A flat grant system would exist in a state distributing 
foundation aid with no equalizing aid.  By 1992, only one state was still using a flat grant 
system exclusively (Card and Payne, 2002).   
Minimum foundation plans and variable grants take the district’s ability to 
generate local funds into account when determining state aid.  States that use a minimum 
foundation plan calculate a foundation level of spending, or “the minimum amount the 
state expects to be spent per pupil in all districts” and the amount of revenue the district is 
expected to generate from local sources, such as property taxes (Card and Payne, 2002, 
52).  The state then provides the district with the difference between the minimum 
foundation level and local revenue levels.  Variable grant systems are similar to minimum 
foundation plan systems, but rely on how much funding the district actually raises from 
local sources, rather than an expected value like minimum foundation plans.  The state 
provides districts with funding to make up for differences between the target funding 
level and how much the district raises from property taxes.  Variable grant systems 
promote equalization between districts, since poorer districts receive more equalizing 
state aid than richer districts.  Additionally, some states have recapture provisions in their 
variable grant models that have “negative” grants for wealthier districts (Card and Payne, 
2002). 
States also vary greatly in the extent to which they fund education.  For the 1991-
92 school year, New Hampshire’s contributions to school funds was only 8% of total 
funding, whereas New Mexico’s state contributions totaled 85% of funding (GAO 1997). 
Figure 2 (Sipple 2009) depicts the various levels at which states finance schools.  
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Legal Challenges to School Finance 
The California Supreme Court case of Serrano v. Priest (1971) is generally 
considered the beginning of the school finance equalization movement.  In this case, 
parents challenged the constitutionality of the California’s method of financing for 
schools, alleging that the disparity in resources available to districts violated Article 1 
Section 7 of the California Constitution, which states, “A person may not be…denied 
equal protection of the laws.”  Parents complained that in order to raise the same amount 
of funds as other districts, parents in Los Angeles faced higher tax rates.  Prior to 
Serrano, “Baldwin Park, a low-income city near Los Angeles, was spending $595 for 
each student while Beverly Hills was able to spend $1,244, even though the latter district 
had a tax rate less than half that of the former” (Kozol, 1991, 220).  In 1971, the court 
ruled that California’s system of financing education violated both the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution and the equal protection clause in the 
California state constitution (Lukemeyer, 2004).  The California Supreme Court decided 
that the pre-Serrano system of funding education “insidiously discriminates against the 
poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his 
parents and neighbors” (Serrano v. Priest, 1971).  In deciding a case similar to Serrano, 
the United States Supreme Court concluded in San Antonio Independent District v. 
Rodriguez (1973) that Texas’ education finance system did not violate the fourteenth 
amendment’s equal protection clause.  Since then, court cases involving school finance 
have mostly been heard at the state level and have alleged that a state’s system of 
financing education violates clauses in the state constitution.     
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In the 20 years following Serrano v. Priest, courts in 21 states declared school 
funding schemes unconstitutional (Card and Payne, 2002).  However, a court decision 
does not mean overnight change.  Many court decisions are not very specific, and call on 
the state legislature to revise the school finance system.  Some states will experience new 
cases, in which the constitutionality of the new system is challenged.  In New Jersey, a 
battle between the state legislature and state courts over the constitutionality of the state’s 
system for financing K-12 education lasted nearly 30 years (Yinger, 2004).  Some states’ 
supreme courts have upheld the constitutionality of school financing on the grounds that 
it is not the court’s responsibility to decide these matters.  In a few states, legislative 
reform was passed without any legal challenges or the legislature developed a new 
finance system to settle a pending court case.   
Carr and Fuhrman (1999) explore why judges have the best incentives to reform 
education.  Although governors and legislators can gain a lot of public support by 
promising to improve public education, issues of finance, especially taxes, can polarize 
voters.  Increased state aid to schools can mean higher taxes for residents, so groups such 
as the elderly will be likely to oppose a candidate who has or will raise taxes to improve 
education.  Additionally, representatives from lower-wealth districts might not have as 
much influence in a state legislature as those from wealthier districts.  Courts, on the 
other hand, have a responsibility to interpret the state constitution.  Constituents who 
want to challenge a state’s system of financing education may have better luck going 
through the judicial system than lobbying a legislator.   
  The history of school finance reform cases is divided into three waves 
(Lukemeyer, 2004).  The first wave of cases, which includes Serrano v. Priest, alleged 
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that methods of financing schools violated the equal protection clause in the United 
States Constitution.  Lukemeyer classifies the reforms of the mid-1970s through the 
1980s as the second wave of court cases.  Most of the plaintiffs in the second wave of 
cases argued that school finance systems violated clauses in state constitutions that 
guaranteed equal protection and provision of public education.  In every state 
constitution, there is a clause regarding public education.  Some states go into more 
specific details about how education will be provided, while others merely mention the 
responsibility of the state to “establish and maintain” schools.  In some states, the 
language of education clauses has been used to allege that the system of financing 
education does not live up to the promises of the state constitution.  The third wave of 
education finance reform cases began in 1989, with an influx of cases that challenged 
solely the education clauses in state constitution and placed less emphasis on equal 
protection clauses.  Baker and Welner (forthcoming) suggest that a new pattern emerged 
from 2007 to 2009, with state courts arguing that it is the responsibility of the state 
legislature, and not the courts, to reform school finance.   
  There are four standards that have been used to challenge school finance systems 
in court (Lukemeyer, 2004).  Minimum adequacy is the idea that all students deserve an 
education at a basic minimum level of spending.  This is a similar concept to the floor 
level that states determine in a minimum foundation plan.  Districts can spend more 
money per pupil or provide more services, but a minimum adequacy requirement implies 
that districts cannot spend below the minimum per pupil level.   
  The next standard is equality, simply meaning that all districts spend the same 
amount per pupil.  Lukemeyer’s third standard, access equality, means that each district 
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has the potential to raise the same amount of revenues with the same tax effort.  
However, this is unlikely to occur since districts have varying tax bases and residents can 
usually vote on property taxes (or vote with their feet by moving out of a district or state).  
Finally, the wealth neutrality standard states that a district’s per pupil expenditure should 
not be directly correlated with the districts property tax base.   
Most state courts have looked at adequacy and equality standards, with a select few 
making decisions based on access equality or wealth neutrality standards.  The third wave 
of school finance reform has been mainly based on adequacy claims (Minorini and 
Sugarman, 1999).  The 1989 case of Rose v. Council for Better Education in Kentucky is 
seen as the beginning of this wave, with the court determining that Kentucky’s 
constitution entitled all students to a sufficient education that would prepare them for 
future academic and vocational endeavors (Schrag, 2003).  Rose began as an equity case, 
but the adequacy decision spurred litigation across the nation.  Subsequent third wave 
cases challenged the state’s provision of an adequate education as expressed in the state 
constitution’s education clause.  A few cases prior to Rose contained some elements of 
adequacy, but the vast majority of cases were decided on equity grounds.  Of the sixteen 
states experiencing reform between 1989 and 1999, four cases were decided primarily on 
equity grounds, whereas the remaining twelve cases were decided on adequacy grounds.  
Two of the four equity cases occurred in 1989, before the Rose decision brought the 
concept of adequacy into the forefront of school finance litigation. 
Baker and Green (2008) note that the influx of adequacy decisions represents a 
greater concern for outputs to the education production function.  School finance reform 
was no longer merely about equalization, but about providing each student with the 
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resources to receive an adequate education.  Heise (1995) argues that the shift from 
equity to adequacy standards during the third wave of school finance reform can be 
attributed to three factors: the complexity of equity claims, the belief that equity 
contradicted the value of local control over schools, and the desire of large urban school 
districts to turn their focus away from equity arguments.  He also notes, as Baker and 
Green suggest, that adequacy is consistent with the recent standards movement and the 
belief in adjusting inputs for the purpose of achieving specific outcomes, rather than for 
the sake of equalizing inputs.   
The literature on school finance reform also differentiates between reforms that 
“level up” and level down.”  Paris (2010) describes the difference between these two 
types of reforms.  Leveling up refers to school finance reform that aims to bring all 
districts up to the level of spending of the wealthiest districts.  When a state levels down, 
funding is redistributed so as to make the wealthiest districts spend closer to what the 
poorer districts spend.  Hoxby (2001) argues that it is not whether a state experiences a 
reform that is important but how a state reforms its system of school finance.  However, 
much of the literature on school finance reform focuses on the presence of a reform as the 
variable of interest.       
Effects of Reforms on State Aid 
State spending on education tripled during the 1970s (Berke et al., 1984).  School 
districts experienced an average of a 59% increase in state aid per student between 1977 
and 1992 (Card and Payne, 2002).  The increase was greater (average of 85%) for states 
whose funding systems were declared unconstitutional than those whose systems were 
upheld (48%) and those states that had no decision (46%).  Card and Payne found that the 
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amount of aid that poor districts received relative to their wealthier counterparts increased 
by $300 more per pupil in states where the court had overturned a system of education 
finance compared to states where the court had upheld the current system or there had 
been no decision.  This suggests that court decisions requiring states to change their 
funding schemes led to increased redistribution of state aid in the 1980s, with poorer 
districts receiving significantly more state funding than wealthy districts.   
Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1999) use race as a proxy for income, since black 
students are more likely to attend schools in low-income districts.  They find that reform 
led to an average increase of $664 (in 1992 dollars) in state aid per student for black 
students and $434 for white students.  However, average per-pupil expenditures for white 
students grew relative to those for black students in states experiencing a reform.  Local 
revenues increased for white students, whereas local revenues for black students 
experienced a decrease.  Thus, it appears that some of the gains of increased state aid to 
minority students as a result of school finance reform were offset by decreases in local 
expenditures.   
Effects of Reforms on District Expenditures  
Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) find that court-ordered reforms reduced 
spending inequality by 19 to 34 percent within states between 1971 and 1996.  Murray 
and colleagues found that while spending for those districts at the bottom of the wealth 
distribution increased by 11% following a court-ordered reform, patterns of spending did 
not change for those districts at the top of the wealth distribution.  Evans, Murray, and 
Schwab (1999) also examine the effect of reform on private contributions.  Wealthy 
school districts have been able to raise money through local educational foundations, but 
  11 
not enough to negate the equalization achieved by school finance reform.  Manwaring 
and Sheffrin (1997) use panel data from 1970-1990 and find that reforms led to different 
outcomes in different states, with some states experiencing increases in average district 
spending and some experiencing decreases. 
Card and Payne (2002) find that “each additional dollar in state aid received by a 
school district leads to a 30-65 cent increase in spending” (80).  More aid to poorer 
districts has raised the expenditures in these districts.  Court-ordered school finance 
reform has led to greater spending equality between rich and poor school districts.  States 
that experience court-ordered reform saw a small decrease in the correlation between 
family income and district spending per student, while this relationship appeared to be 
strengthened in states in which the system of financing education was upheld.  Springer, 
Liu, and Guthrie (2009) find that court ordered school finance reform decreased the 
correlation between income and spending from 1972-2002.     
Goertz and Natriello (1999) compare district expenditures in the 1989-90 school 
year (pre-reform) with expenditures in the 1992-93 school year (post-reform) for 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Texas.  They find that for the latter years, “the highest-wealth 
districts still spent more, on average, than the lowest-wealth districts, but the extent of 
disparity had decreased substantially in Kentucky (63 percent to 12 percent) and in Texas 
(from 29 percent to 14 percent) and moderately in New Jersey (from 29 percent to 14 
percent” (110).  Although lower-wealth districts still lagged behind wealthier districts in 
terms of expenditures, there was a greater equality of spending in the three states Goertz 
and Natriello studied.  Hoxby (2001) notes that greater spending-equality was reached in 
those states that leveled down compared to those that leveled up.  She suggests that it is 
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harder to force a district to spend more under the leveling up model than it is for states to 
impose high taxes on wealthy districts as part of a leveling down model.   
Does Money Even Matter? 
  While reviewing the literature on equalization of state aid and spending, it is 
important to ask the question, “Does money matter?”  If parents allege that their children 
are not receiving an adequate education under the current financing scheme, would new 
methods of finance lead to better educational quality?  Many studies have attempted to 
find the link between school expenditures and student performance.  While initially 
scholars did not see a link between money and outcomes, more recent studies have 
confirmed some evidence of this relationship. 
  Grissmer, Flanagan, and Wiliamson (1998) attribute the origin of the view that 
money was not a determining factor of educational quality to the 1966 “Coleman 
Report.”  This government report declared that the disparity in educational outcomes for 
students of different income levels was more attributable to parent and family variables 
than school factors.  Levin (1976) believed that Serrano was likely to benefit teachers, 
who would receive higher wages, than students, who would continue to lag behind their 
wealthier peers.  In a meta-analysis of expenditure studies, Hanushek (1989) argues that 
not enough studies have found statistically significant results that expenditures can 
improve student performance.  When a district increases expenditures, the additional 
spending is often spent on wages for more teachers or teachers who are more educated 
and/or experienced.  Goertz and Natriello (1999) find that low-wealth districts in Texas, 
Kentucky, and New Jersey used increased state aid towards staff salaries, staff 
development, materials and resources, programs, and facilities.  Hanushek finds, “The 
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results are startlingly consistent in finding no strong evidence that teacher-student ratios, 
teacher education, or teacher experience have the expected positive effects on student 
achievement” (47).  He recommends against using disparities in expenditures as the basis 
for determining school finance policies aimed at equalizing outcomes.   
In another meta-analysis that included more longitudinal studies, Hedges and 
Greenwald (1996) contradict Hanushek, finding that a teacher who is better educated and 
has better verbal abilities has a positive affect on student achievement.  Grissmer, 
Flanagan, and Williamson (1998) reference a study of disadvantaged students in 
Tennessee, which found that reduced class sizes led to test score gains.  They conclude 
that while the maxim of “money doesn’t matter” may hold true for wealthier students, 
spending and resources can affect educational outcomes for minority and disadvantaged 
students.  Goertz and Natriello (1999) point out that since state aid can fluctuate from 
year to year, low-wealth districts are more likely to spend aid on durable resources that 
will continue to provide value after funding is cut, such as facility improvements and 
technology.  Card and Krueger (1992b) find that, “Men who are educated in states with 
higher-quality school systems earn higher economic returns for their years of schooling” 
(36).  Attending better schools can provide lifelong benefits, including higher wages.     
  Card and Payne (2002) report “tentative” results for the effect of school finance 
reform on SAT scores.  There is modest evidence showing that more equalized spending 
systems lead to more low-income students taking the SAT, and that there was a 5% 
decrease in the score gap between students from families with highly educated parents 
and those with little education.  There is evidence that dropout rates declined in districts 
that would have had low spending without finance reform, but not for other districts 
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(Hoxby, 2001).  Evans and colleagues (1999) note that there is a need for more research 
on court-mandated reforms’ effects on a variety of student outcomes.  However, there is 
limited data for researchers to examine this effect.  Hoxby (2001) notes that there is no 
nationally administered test given to all students that would help researchers calculate an 
effect of school finance reforms on outcomes.   
HYPOTHESES  
Most studies of school finance reform have looked at the effects of court ordered 
reform from the 1970s and 1980s.  However, there have been many changes in school 
finance equalization since 1989.  In 1992, 21 of the 48 mainland states had no court 
decision (Card and Payne, 2002).  By 2000, there were only seven states that had not had 
court decisions regarding school finance.  Additionally, many states with court decisions 
before 1992 had subsequent decisions that either upheld or overturned the ruling in the 
previous case. I propose to examine the outcomes resulting from the court-ordered school 
finance reforms of the 1990s.  I will examine how the third wave of school finance 
reform affected the relationship between district median income and state aid per pupil, 
as well as the relationship between median income and per pupil expenditures.  
Not only did more states experience a court-mandated overhaul of their school 
finance systems after 1989, but many of these decisions called for more sweeping reform 
(Murray et al., 1997, 791).  The majority of school finance reform cases in the 1990s 
challenged the state’s provision of an adequate education for all students.  Unlike the 
equity cases of the 1980s that solely called for redistribution of funds, adequacy decisions 
also set new curriculum standards.  However, many adequacy cases were more concerned 
with providing a minimum level of funding to each district than ensuring that each 
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district was spending the same amount.  While some adequacy decisions also incorporate 
equity principles, equity was not necessarily a feature of the adequacy movement.  
Springer, Liu, and Guthrie (2009) find no significant difference between equity and 
adequacy reforms in decreasing the relationship between income and expenditures.     
I predict that states whose education finance systems the state Supreme Court 
found unconstitutional after 1989 will experience a decrease in the association between 
income and district expenditures.  I also predict that the association between income and 
state aid in a district will become more negative in reform states, meaning that poorer 
districts in reform states will receive more aid, on average, than wealthier districts than 
similar districts in a non-reform state.  However, I do not expect to see as large of a 
magnitude of change as Card and Payne (2002), since adequacy cases were more focused 
on providing a minimum level of funding to poorer districts and did not contain as many 
provisions for equalizing funds between districts.         
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DATA 
  For dependent variables, I look at the effects of school finance reform on district 
spending and state aid in the 48 contiguous states.  For finance data, I use the Local 
Education Agency Finance Survey (F-33) Data, obtained from the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data.  This data contains information on revenues 
and expenditures for each school district in the United States.  I examine districts’ per 
pupil spending for the years 1990 and 2000, as well as state aid per student received 
during those years.   
  I use a variety of other measures as controls, such as district median household 
income and racial composition.  I obtained this data from the School District Data Book 
(SDDB) from the 1990 Census and the School District Tabulation (STP2) from the 2000 
Census.  Information on grade span, district type (elementary, secondary, or unified), and 
district size comes from the 1989-90 and 2000-01 Local Education Agency Universe 
Survey Data.   
  First, I will examine the relationship between median household income and 
district expenditures in each state in both 1990 and 2000, by estimating the following 
equation: 
Spending = α +β1Income +ηControls +ε   (1) 
  Spending represents per pupil expenditures in a district.  The coefficient β1 
represents the relationship between spending and income when controlling for other 
district characteristics, such as average number of students per school, proximity to a 
metropolitan statistical area, type of district (elementary, secondary, or both) and racial 
composition (fraction of Black and American Indian students).  These controls are similar 
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to those used by Card and Payne (2002).  I also estimate the relationship between state 
aid per student and median household income, using the equation: 
State Aid = α +β2Income +ηControls +ε       (2) 
If state aid and expenditures are completely equalized across all levels of median income, 
β1 and β2 will be equal to zero.  A negative value for either coefficient would indicate that 
districts with lower median income levels receive more state aid or spend more.  In the 
next equations, I look at how these values have changed between 1990 and 2000.  If 
school finance reform made spending and state aid more equitably distributed to students 
of various income levels, β1 and β2 should become more negative over time.  I also run 
equations 1 and 2 in a model that includes an average weight for district size.   
I have divided states based on the presence and outcome of state Supreme Court 
rulings on school finance.  I created a dummy variable for states experiencing a reform in 
the 1990s, with those that experienced a reform between 1989 and 1999 being coded as 1 
and those whose systems were upheld during this period receiving a 0.  States who 
experienced court decisions before this time period were coded as missing for generating 
this variable.  I determine if a state had a reform during this period if the highest court in 
that state declared the system of financing education unconstitutional.  A state was coded 
as “upheld” if the court had upheld the state’s system of financing education as 
constitutional.  However, if the state had experienced a court-ordered reform prior to 
1989, but the reformed system was challenged and upheld, I coded the state as “pre-
1989.”  For example, Kansas had its school finance system overturned by state courts in 
1976, but in 1994, the Kansas supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the prior 
reform.  Baker and Welner (forthcoming) note the difficulty of categorizing school 
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finance reforms, due to the complexity of legal challenges in states such as Kansas.  
Categorizing states was further complicated by the fact that previous literature disagrees 
on which states should be classified as having had reforms, and whether those reforms 
were decided on adequacy or equity grounds.     
To find the effect of reform on the association between income and finance 
variables, I run the regressions: 
Δβ1 = Ζ1Reform + ε   (3)   
Δβ2 = Ζ2Reform + ε   (4) 
where Δβn  represents the change in βn between 1990 and 2000.  Equations 3 and 4 are 
similar to the way that Card and Payne (2002) and Springer, Liu, and Guthrie (2009) 
estimate the effect of reform on inequality.   
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SUMMARY STATISTICS 
After merging Common Core of Data files for finances and school characteristics 
with census data on district racial composition and median family income, I dropped 
districts that were not found in all of the finance, school characteristics, and census files.  
The remaining data set includes information for 14,205 school districts for 1990 and 
14,106 districts for 2000 in 48 states.  Districts eliminated from the original data set 
included districts not located within the 48 contiguous United States, such as districts in 
Alaska, Hawaii, District of Columbia, and United States Territories, as well as districts 
located on military bases.   
Between 1989 and 1999, 16 states had their systems of finance overturned by 
state courts, whereas 15 states had their systems of school finance upheld.  Of the 
approximately 14,000 districts in the sample, roughly 10,000 were located in states that 
experienced court decisions in this period.  The breakdown of districts experiencing cases 
in this period was split roughly evenly between those whose systems had been reformed 
and upheld.  In both 1990 and 2000, racial composition did not differ much, with the 
average school district in both the ‘reform’ and ‘upheld’ categories having about 4-5% 
Black students.        
I dropped five districts that listed a median income below $1,000 for each year.  
District median family income in the resulting data set in 1989 (in 2000 dollars) ranged 
from $3,293.81 to $196,450.60, with a median of $39,206.85.  Median income in a 
district for 1999, ranged from $2,499 to $192,787, with a median of $37,060.50.  While 
the low values of the minimum median income are very low, there were only eleven 
districts in the 1990 data and three districts in the 2000 data that had median incomes 
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listed between $1,000 and $10,000.  Therefore, I do not think that these few districts with 
low median incomes have much of an effect on my results.  A few of these districts are 
also dropped when I exclude districts with no reported enrollment in 1990 and 2000.   
Median income does not appear to differ much between states that had their 
systems of education finance overturned and those that did not (Table 1).  In 1990, the 
median amount districts spent per pupil was $6,182.64 (in 2000 dollars).  The median 
amount of state aid per student was $2,725.31 in 1990 (estimated in 2000 dollars).  In 
2000, the median district per pupil expenditures was $7,822.79, and the median amount 
of state aid per student districts received was $4,000.22.  
For states that had court decisions between 1989 and 1999, mean state aid per 
student was $2,710.03 in 1990 and mean expenditures per pupil were $7,422.30.  In 
2000, districts that had experienced reform had a mean state aid per pupil of $4,236.80 
and mean expenditures per pupil of $9,080.81 (Table 2).  Districts experiencing a reform 
between 1989 and 1999 saw, on average, a 56.3% increase in state aid per student, 
compared to a 45.7% increase for those whose systems were upheld by state courts and a 
41.5% increase in those states with no court decision (Table 3).  This result is not as 
extreme as that found by Card and Payne (2002), but follows the trend that districts with 
reforms experienced greater gains in state aid per student than the other two categories.  
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RESULTS    
Relationship between Income and Expenditures per Pupil 
  First, I calculated the relationship between median income and per pupil 
expenditures for 1990 and 2000.  To define expenditures per pupil, I created a variable 
dividing a district’s total expenditures in a given year by the total number of enrolled 
students prekindergarten through twelfth grade.  I ran regressions for each year finding 
the relationship between median income and district expenditures per pupil, controlling 
for factors such as racial composition in a district, location, and grades taught (Eq. 1).   
 On  average,  β1 = 0.036 for 1990, meaning that per pupil expenditures were about 
$36 higher for every additional $1,000 in median income in a district.  In 1990, median 
income was $27,586.30 at the 10
th percentile and $62,553.36 at the 90
th percentile (in 
2000 dollars).  This would mean that districts at the 90
th percentile spent, on average, 
$1,258.81 more per pupil than those at the 10
th percentile.  In 2000, median income was 
$26,779.00 at the 10
th percentile and $60,125.00 at the 90
th percentile.  For 2000, average 
β1 = 0.019, meaning that an additional $1,000 in median family income led to an 
additional $19 in per pupil expenditures.  This means that districts at the 90
th percentile 
spent $666.92 more per pupil than those at the 10
th percentile of the income distribution. 
  For districts that experienced reform between 1989 and 1999, β1 decreased by 
0.005 during the 1990s, meaning that gap in spending between districts was reduced by 
$5 per pupil for every $1,000 of income.  Contrary to my hypothesis, states with no 
reform during this period, as well as those whose systems of financing education were 
upheld by state supreme courts, had greater reductions in inequality during this period (β1 
=  -0.030).  These findings differ from those of Card and Payne (2002) who found that 
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states in which courts found the system of school finance unconstitutional between 1971 
and 1992 experienced a decrease in spending inequality while other states experienced 
increased inequality.  However, I find that expenditures became more equal on average 
during the 1990s, whereas Card and Payne find greater inequality in expenditures over 
the 1980s.   
  When weighting by district size (number of pupils) in the regression equation, the 
reduction in inequality is slightly less, with β1 decreasing by 0.011 for all states between 
1990 and 2000.  However, the relationship between income and spending looks to have 
decreased by $11 for every $1,000 in income when using this model, compared to $5 in 
the unweighted model.      
Relationship between Income and State Aid Per Pupil 
  Using Equation 2, I calculated the relationship between income and state aid per 
pupil.  I generated a variable for state aid per pupil by dividing revenues a district 
received from the state in a given year divided by the total enrollment, pre-kindergarten 
through twelfth grade, in that district.  I controlled for the same variables as in the 
expenditures equation. 
  On the whole, the relationship between income and state aid decreased during the 
1990s.  I found a consistent negative correlation between state aid and income, meaning 
that poorer districts tend to receive more state aid than wealthier districts.  Again, districts 
with court ordered reform seemed to experience the least amount of change, experiencing 
no change in the relationship between income and state aid per pupil during the 1990s.  
Districts that did not experience a court decision in the 1990s had the greatest reduction 
amount of change in the relationship between income and state aid (β2 = -0.024).    
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  When weighting for the number of pupils in a district, β2 = -0.009 for all states.  
In this model, states that experienced reforms had a slightly greater reduction in 
inequality (β2 = -0.008) than those states in which the courts upheld the system of 
education finance (β2 = -0.006), but states that did not experience a reform during this 
period still experienced the biggest shift (β2 = -0.013). 
Effect of Court Ordered Reforms 
  To examine the effect of reform on the distribution of spending and state aid 
among rich and poor districts, I calculated the effect of reform on the change in β1 and β2 
using equations 3 and 4.  These equations are similar to Card and Payne’s (2002) 
equations for finding the effect of reforms on the same dependent variables.   
  Using the estimates for Δβ1 and Δβ2 from the model with the weights for pupils in 
a district, I find that reforms during the 1990s decreased the relationship between income 
and state aid by 0.003 and seemed to increase the relationship between income and 
spending by 0.005.  However, neither of estimates appears statistically significant.  When 
using the model that is not weighted, reforms seem to have increased inequality for both 
spending and state aid, but these coefficients are also not statistically significant (Tables 
4-7).    
DISCUSSION 
  One possible reason for the difference between my results and Card and Payne’s 
(2002) results may be that adequacy cases had some fundamental differences from equity 
cases.  Schrag (2003) notes that unlike previous waves of school finance reform, 
adequacy reforms did not seek to equalize resources but rather provide all children with 
the resources necessary to achieve school success.  An equal distribution of resources 
  24 
may not lead to an adequate education for all students.  Schrag (2003) writes, “What’s 
numerically equal may, in fact, not be adequate to meet the requirements of a high-tech 
economy, the varying social and educational needs of different kinds of students, or the 
complex social and civic demands of contemporary society” (3).   
While adequacy reforms tended to be more comprehensive in their demands for 
changes, they did not necessarily require a change in the distribution of funds between 
wealthy and poor districts.  Rather, adequacy decisions often spelled out specific 
standards for an adequate education.  In the Rose decision in Kentucky, Chief Justice 
Robert Stephens highlights the foundations of an adequate education, which include 
communication skills, knowledge of history, and necessary job market skills (Schrag, 
2003).  While a legislature will often devise a more redistributive aid plan following an 
adequacy case, an adequacy decision will not necessarily lead to a more equitable 
distribution of resources between schools.   
 Another  possible  explanation  for the lack of significant effects of school finance 
reform could be that some of the states whose finance systems were upheld had a 
legislative reform that led to greater equalization.  Some state legislatures preemptively 
created a new system of education finance to avoid litigation.  Some states also had a 
legislative reform passed during the time a case was being heard in the courts.  It is 
difficult to tease out exactly which states experienced reform, since some states that did 
not have judicial reform experienced other policy changes during this period.  Also, in 
some states that did have a judicial reform, the reform was not implemented right away, 
due to debate in the legislature over how to fix the finance system or due to another case 
or further legal challenge that sought to overturn the reform ruling.  Baker and Welner 
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(forthcoming) note that one of the greatest difficulties in analyzing the effects of school 
finance reform is determining when a reform has taken effect.  A state may have a court 
order to reform its school finance system, but it could be many years before the 
legislature approves a new finance plan, and the new finance plan could become the 
subject of subsequent litigation.  Schrag (2003) cites Ohio as an example of a state where 
an adequacy decision was not met with open arms by the state legislature.  Schrag writes, 
“[The courts] can declare a state fiscal structure unconstitutional and order the legislature 
to fix it, but where the political system is reluctant, as it has been in Ohio, that can be like 
trying to push string uphill” (233).   
  Another complication is that reformed systems can look very different.  Indeed, a 
changed system of financing education does not necessarily mean that a system that 
would equalize expenditures between rich and poor districts.   Berry (2007) advocates 
moving away from the dummy variable method of categorizing between states that 
experienced a reform and those that did not.  He argues that future research should try to 
find the effects of reform when looking at what specifically the reforms entailed.  Card 
and Payne (2002) looked at changes between foundation grants, minimum foundation 
plans, and variable grants.  They find significant results that moving from a flat grant to a 
variable grant program can reduce the relationships between income and expenditures 
and income and state aid.  Hoxby (2001) also finds that whether a reform aims to increase 
(level up) or decrease spending (level down) in relation to tax prices can have differing 
effects on the drop out rate.   
Despite having a greater increase in state revenues, districts in reform states 
actually experienced less of an increase in spending that those states whose fiscal systems 
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were upheld or did not face a judicial decision.  Additionally, states with a reform in the 
1990s did not experience as great of a reduction in spending inequality as those states that 
did not experience a reform.  A possible hypothesis for this result could be that, following 
reform, wealthy districts raised more local revenues to compensate for decreased state 
aid.  One response to Proposition 13 in California, a tax limit introduced after Serrano v. 
Priest, was the establishment of local educational foundations.  These organizations 
allowed wealthy districts to raise funds independent of the property tax system.  It is 
possible that wealthy districts in other states created educational foundations to generate 
additional revenues for schools.      
  While the effects of adequacy reforms on spending inequality and distribution of 
state aid seem somewhat ambiguous, it would be interesting to see the effect of adequacy 
reforms on outcomes.  Unlike equity reforms that were decided on the grounds of 
unequal aid distribution and spending, adequacy reforms are based on the tenet that all 
students deserve, at minimum, a basic or adequate education.  Whereas equity reforms 
were concerned with the distribution of inputs into the education system, adequacy 
reform seeks to achieve some equalization of outputs.  Perhaps looking at educational 
outcomes, rather than inputs, would be a better way to measure the effect of adequacy 
reforms.  However, finding a good outcome measure is very difficult, as there is no 
national achievement test that all students take and dropout rate data is not consistently 
reported between states.  Studies have shown that money can improve educational 
outcomes for certain groups of students, but most of the current research on school 
finance reform concludes with the notion that we do not yet have good information about 
the effects of reformed fiscal systems on educational outcomes. 
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A Closer Look at Three States 
  In order to try to disentangle the complexities of adequacy reforms, I profile three 
states, Kentucky, Vermont, and Wyoming, that experienced state supreme court decisions 
in the period I study.  In all three states, the existing system of financing education was 
overturned on adequacy grounds.  However, each state took a slightly different response 
to designing a new education finance system.      
Kentucky 
 The  Rose v. Council for Better Education (1989) decision in Kentucky is credited 
as the beginning of the wave of adequacy cases.  After the Kentucky Supreme Court 
declared the state’s system of education unconstitutional, the state legislature passed the 
Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 (KERA).  This law both changed the system of 
financing schools in Kentucky and set new curriculum standards.  The Rose decision 
included the recommendation that certain skills, such as oral and written communication 
skills, be taught to all students in the state (Flanagan and Murray, 2004).  The state 
legislature modified the standards suggested by the court and wrote KERA with a list of 
specific skills necessary for an adequate education.   
Prior to Rose and KERA, Kentucky was among the states that spent the least on 
education, and property taxes comprised a large portion of local revenues for schools 
(Flanagan and Murray, 2004).  Kentucky also had a long history of flat grant programs, 
although the state had experiment with a minimum foundation program and the “Power 
Equalization Program,” in which districts that levied a minimum tax rate were given 
funding to make up the difference between the amount raised through taxes and the 
amount that the district with the most property wealth in that county would have raised 
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with the same tax rate.  Flanagan and Murray (2004) claim that few districts taxed at the 
minimum rate for the Power Equalization Program and the program did not receive full 
funding from the state.   
  KERA established a new system of school finance in Kentucky, Supporting 
Education Excellence in Kentucky (SEEK).  SEEK was first implemented in 1990-91.  
Under SEEK, the state sets a base rate per pupil that is guaranteed to each school.  The 
SEEK formula includes weights for pupils with special needs and students receiving free 
and reduced price lunch, and the base is weighted higher for districts with low population 
density and children educated in home or hospital settings (Flanagan and Murray, 2004).  
The state also provides additional funds to property-poor districts (less than 150% of the 
state average) that raise local revenues beyond the minimum tax rate required by SEEK.   
  Flanagan and Murray (2004) find that KERA had an equalizing effect on school 
revenues in Kentucky.  For the 1989-90 school year, districts at the 5
th percentile of 
property wealth received a mean of $4,379 per pupil in total revenues, with $3,140 
coming from the state, whereas districts in the 95
th percentile had a mean of $5,547 per 
pupil in total revenues, with $2,803 coming from the state.  For the 1997-98 school year, 
districts at the 5
th percentile of per-pupil property wealth had a mean of $6,784 per pupil 
in total revenues, with $4,899 coming from the state, while districts at the 95
th percentile 
had a mean of $6,839 in per pupil revenues, with $2,754 coming from the state.  While 
spending increased across all districts in Kentucky during the period of Flanagan and 
Murray’s study, the state increased aid to poorer districts in such a way that the inequality 
in spending variation was reduced.  Flanagan and Murray also find a small, but 
insignificant effect of KERA on improving student test scores. 
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  I find that Δβ1 = -0.023 and Δβ2 = -0.034 for Kentucky.  Flanagan and Murray 
found that inequality was reduced in Kentucky’s school finance system following KERA, 
but that between 1997 and 2000, the trend began to reverse.  However, I find that both 
spending and state aid per pupil became more equal between 1990 and 2000 in Kentucky.  
It appears that Kentucky’s attempt to provide students with an adequate education 
resulted in a system of education finance that was more equal across income levels.      
Vermont 
Vermont’s school finance reform is considered one of the most dramatic in the 
country, and has often been compared to the reforms that California enacted following 
Serrano v. Priest (1971).  Downes (2004) rejects the notion of using California as a 
benchmark case to study school finance reform, citing changes in demographics in 
California that could influence findings on the effect of school finance reform.  He notes 
that Vermont experienced very little demographic change following large-scale school 
finance reforms, making it a prime example to study.  
In 1997, Vermont’s supreme court ruled in Brigham v. State that the state’s school 
finance system was unconstitutional.  The case was decided on both adequacy and equity 
grounds.  Downes (2004) notes that the Vermont legislature had tried on two prior 
occasions to reform school finance before the Brigham case, but such reforms had failed 
to pass in the state senate.  Less than six months after Brigham, the legislature passed Act 
60, which set a statewide property tax rate of $1.10 for every $100 of property value, 
resulting in a grant of $5,100 per pupil to each school (Baker, 2001).  Vermont also 
included a provision for districts to raise additional funds through a supplemental tax 
levy, so long as revenues were contributed to a sharing pool.  Baker (2001) notes that 
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some Vermonters saw Act 60 as a socialist program, and some wealthy districts found 
ways to avoid revenue sharing by creating private foundations.  Private foundations took 
away an estimated $26 million from the shared funding pool (Rebell and Metzler, 2002).   
  Rebell and Metzler (2002) describe the impact of Act 60 on Vermont residents.  
They write, “Under [Act 60], 89% of Vermont residents were eligible for decreases in 
their property taxes.  A total of 229 districts received more money for their schools, while 
only 23 received less” (182).  Rebell and Metzler compare a poor Vermont district, 
Rutland, to wealthier districts.  Rutland property tax rates decreased by 7.5% and the 
schools were able to buy new textbooks for the first time in two decades.  Ski resort 
towns, which have much greater property wealth than Rutland, saw taxes nearly double 
under Act 60, while per pupil expenditures decreased.  Wealthy non-residents own many 
of the properties in the ski towns as vacation homes.  Therefore, the Vermont legislature 
was not as concerned about increased tax rates in this region, since those bearing the 
brunt of the increased taxes could not vote in state elections.   
  Baker (2001) compares Vermont school finance in fiscal year 1996-97, before Act 
60 was introduced, to the 1998-99 fiscal year, the first in which Act 60 was implemented.  
He finds that state aid per pupil increased, but not as much as in prior years.  Baker does 
not analyze his results by different income or property wealth levels.  Downes (2004) 
compares district expenditures from the 1997-98 year to 2000-01 and finds that Act 60 
led to a weakened relationship between property wealth and district expenditures.  He 
also finds some small evidence that student performance on a state exam became more 
equalized across district following the passage of Act 60.   
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  According to my data, per pupil expenditures became more equalized across 
Vermont between 1990 and 2000 (Δβ1 = -0.013), but state aid per pupil became even 
more unequal (Δβ2 = 0.084).  The negative value of Δβ1 supports the goal of Act 60 to 
decrease the correlation between wealth and district expenditures.  However, I find a 
positive value for Δβ2.  In looking closer at my data, I see the Vermont is a prime 
example of a state where property wealth and income are not perfectly correlated.  
Although the ski resort towns have a lot of large homes and taxable properties, the 
residents who live there year-round have similar median incomes to Rutland.  It is 
possible that, in Vermont, money was redistributed from property wealthy districts to 
property poor districts with wealthier residents.     
Wyoming 
  Wyoming first experienced court-ordered school finance reform in 1980, with the 
state supreme court ruling the state’s system of financing education unconstitutional in 
Washakie County School District v. Herschler (National Access Network, 2008).  In 
1995, the state’s highest court once again ruled Wyoming school finance unconstitutional 
in Campbell County School District v. State, a case decided on equity and adequacy 
grounds.  Guthrie and Rothstein (1999) note that while Wyoming is sparsely populated 
and only has 48 school districts, the resulting school finance system is a representative 
model for what other states could encounter following adequacy decisions. 
  In 1997, the Wyoming legislature devised a “basket” of specific courses and skills 
that all students should learn before graduating from high school.  The Wyoming Basket 
reform was similar to the curriculum standards passed under KERA in Kentucky.  The 
Wyoming Basket includes such standards as an emphasis on reading, writing, and 
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mathematics to be taught in grades 1 through 8 and a requirement that students take four 
years of English courses in order to graduate from high school (Guthrie and Rothstein, 
1999).   
  Wyoming enlisted experts to estimate how much the provision of an adequate 
education would cost.  When the Wyoming supreme court asked the state legislature to 
devise a new education finance system, it required that the new system be based on the 
characteristics of an adequate education system, and not the state’s ability to afford such 
reforms (Guthrie and Rothstein, 1999).  The new system was phased in gradually and 
took full effect in the 1998-99 school year.  Each district in Wyoming generates local 
funds through county taxes (6 mills), district taxes (25 mills), and other tax sources 
including railroad taxes and funds from the Taylor Grazing Act.  Hoxby (2001) notes that 
tax rates in Wyoming did not experience much change following school finance reform. 
       Districts are given block grant “entitlement funds” to make up the difference 
between local funds raised and the cost necessary to deliver the “basket” to all students in 
that district.  Wyoming takes characteristics into account such as students with special 
needs and makes adjustments for regional factors when deciding the cost of educating 
students in each district.  If a district generates more funds through local revenues than 
necessary to provide the “basket,” the district is subject to recapture, although very few 
districts in Wyoming are recapture districts (Wyoming Legislative Service Office, 2010).  
However, the recapture provision was not in effect until 2002-03 (Headwaters News, 
2006).       
I find that per pupil expenditures and state aid per pupil became more unequal in 
Wyoming between 1990 and 2000 (Δβ1 = 0.106 and Δβ2 = 0.015).  Only one state 
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(Nevada, which has never had a school finance reform case) experienced a greater 
increase in the relationship between income and spending during this period.  School 
finance reform in Wyoming was focused on providing students with adequate resources, 
and not an equitable distribution of resources.  Baker and Welner (forthcoming) note that 
Wyoming’s most property-wealthy district, located near the Jackson ski resort, was able 
to lobby the state for more funding due to the high cost of living in the area and the 
difficulty retaining teachers who could afford to live near the district.  An increased 
demand for revenues in wealthy districts, along with the fact that the recapture provision 
did not take effect until 2002-03, might explain why I find an increase in state aid 
inequality in Wyoming.   
 
Kentucky, Vermont, and Wyoming all took slightly different approaches to 
remedying their school finance systems following a court order.  In each of the three 
states, providing students with an adequate education was a key part of reform.  Kentucky 
experienced a more equal distribution of state aid per pupil and expenditures per pupil 
across income levels, while Wyoming experienced increased inequality, with wealthier 
districts receiving more state aid and spending more.  In Vermont, spending became more 
equal but state aid appeared to have increased more in the favor of wealthy districts.  
However, Vermont is in a unique position, with the presence of ski resort destinations 
providing tremendous property wealth to certain districts. 
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CONCLUSION  
  Thirty-one states experienced a legal challenge to their systems of financing 
education between 1989 and 1999, with fiscal systems being overturned in sixteen states 
and upheld in the remaining fifteen.  Unlike prior eras of school finance reform, the 
majority of the court cases of the 1990s focused mainly on adequacy standards, the idea 
that all students deserve a basic level of education.  Rather than attempting to equalize 
funding between districts, adequacy reforms sought to provide districts with the 
necessary means to educate students to meet the minimum threshold.   
  I looked at the effects of the court ordered school finance reforms of the 1990s on 
the relationship between district median income and per pupil expenditures as well as the 
relationship between district median income and state aid per pupil.  I found that per 
pupil state revenues increased by 56% in states that experienced a reform during this 
period, compared to 46% in states where the current fiscal system was upheld.  However, 
changes in per pupil expenditures did not experience the same trends, with reform 
districts experiencing a 23% increase in expenditures, while districts in states where the 
system was upheld experienced a 26% increase.  I do not find a statistically significant 
effect of reform on the redistribution of expenditures per pupil or state aid per pupil.     
  As with many other studies of school finance reform, I conclude with the message 
that there is more research needed to determine if adequacy reforms have in fact been 
effective in providing better educational opportunities for students in poorer districts.  
Future studies should also examine exactly how adequacy reforms shifted funding 
formulas for all states, as Card and Payne (2002) and Hoxby (2001) do with previous 
reform periods.  Additionally, if all states reported dropout rates in compliance with the 
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Common Core of Data standards, studies could measure whether adequacy reforms had 
an effect on high school completion for low-income students.   
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Figure 1.  State Aid for Schooling, from Sipple (2009) 
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Figure 2.  State Contributions to Education, from Sipple (2009) 
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able 1: Average Med  d ev
arentheses  
T
P
 
ian Income  (in 2000
Districts with court 
rm in 
ollars), Standard D
Districts where the 
upheld 
 
iations in 
No judicial 
he  ordered refo
the 1990s 
system was 
in the 1990s
decision in t
1990s 
1990  $44,091.90 
(18,272.25)  
$43,546.63 
(15,959.25) 
$39,944.11 
(13,679.85) 
2000  $42,004.20 
(17,727.01) 
$42,086.59 
(15,396.08) 
$38,986.85 
(13,663.90) 
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1990   $7,422.30 
(4070.42) 
$7,510.67 
(3634.12) 
$6,159.48 
(3876.37) 
2000   $9,080.81 
3)  (4464.0
$9,459.70 
47)  (4241.  
$7,830.13 
2)  (2840.6
Change  $1,658.51  $1,949.03  $1,670.65 
Percent Change  22.3%  26.0%  27.1% 
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$4,090.25 
3)  (2173.4
$4,477.51 
0)  (1805.9
Change  $1,526.77  $1,282.62  $1,313,81 
Percent Change  56.3%  45.7%  41.5% 
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able 4: Average Effec come on Expenditures Per Pupil, Stan viations in 
es  
T t of In dard De
Parenthes
  1990  2000  Change 
All states  0.036 
(0.041) 
0.019 
(0.043) 
‐0.017 
(0.044) 
Reform during 90s  0.035 
(0.040) 
0.029 
(0.050) 
‐0.005 
(0.058) 
Upheld during 90s  0.051 
(0.039) 
0.021 
(0.042) 
‐0.030 
(0.035) 
No case during 90s  0.025 
(0.042) 
0.007 
(0.036) 
‐0.017 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
able 5: Average Effec come on State Aid Per Pupil, Standard ions in 
es 
T t of In  Deviat
Parenthes
  1990  2000  Change 
All states  ‐0.033 
(0.036) 
‐0.045 
(0.044) 
‐0.012 
(0.048) 
Reform during 90s  ‐0.041 
(0.055) 
‐0.041 
(0.048) 
0.000 
(0.060) 
Upheld during 90s  ‐0.033 
(0.026) 
‐0.046 
(0.026) 
‐0.013 
(0.018) 
No case during 90s  ‐0.025 
(0.018) 
‐0.050 
(0.055) 
‐0.024 
(0.54) 
 
 
ith weights for number of pupils 
verage Effec come on Expenditures Per Pupil  
W
Table 6: A
 
t of In
1990  2000  Change 
All states  0.035 
(0.048) 
0.023 
(0.039) 
‐0.011 
(0.040) 
Reform during 90s  0.036 
(0.020) 
0.024 
(0.048) 
‐0.011 
(0.044) 
Upheld during 90s  0.045 
(0.047) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
‐0.016 
(0.036) 
No case during 90s  0.025 
(0.062) 
0.018 
(0.0360) 
‐0.007 
(0.041) 
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verage Effec ome on State A Pupil  
 
Table 7: A
 
t of Inc id Per 
1990  2000  Change 
All states  ‐0.034 
(0.034) 
‐0.043 
(0.039) 
‐0.009 
(0.035) 
Reform during 90s  ‐0.042 
(0.050) 
‐0.050 
(0.045) 
‐0.008 
(0.034) 
Upheld during 90s  ‐0.037 
(0.028) 
‐0.042 
(0.023) 
‐0.006 
(0.023) 
No case during 90s  ‐0.026 
(0.018) 
‐0.039 
(0.046) 
‐0.013 
(0.043) 
 
 
 
School Finance Litigation Status, 1971­2000 
REFORM  UPHELD  NO DECISION 
Alabama  Colorado*  Delaware 
Arizona  Florida  Indiana 
Arkansas*   Georgia*  Iowa 
California*  Idaho*  Mississippi 
Connecticut  Illinois  Nevada 
Kansas*  Louisiana  Utah 
Kentucky   Maine   
Massachusetts  Maryland*   
Missouri  Michigan*   
Montana  Minnesota   
New Hampshire  Nebraska   
New Jersey*  New York   
North Carolina  North Dakota   
Ohio  Oklahoma*   
Tennessee  Oregon   
Texas   Pennsylvania   
Vermont  Rhode Island   
Washington *  South Carolina   
West Virginia  South Dakota   
Wyoming  Virginia   
  Wisconsin   
Sources: Card and Payne (2002), National Access Network (2008), Huang, Lukemeyer, and 
Yinger (2004), Gittell (1998)  
 
(Asterisk indicates that court decision occurred prior to 1989). 
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Changes in relationship between district median income and 
expenditure/state aid per pupil, 1990­2000 
State 
Change in 
relationship 
between district 
median income and 
expenditures per 
pupil, 1990­2000 
(Δβ1) 
Change in 
relationship 
between district 
median income and 
state aid per pupil, 
1990­2000  
(Δβ2) 
Mean for All States  ­0.011  ­0.009 
Alabama  0.012  ­0.010 
Arizona  ­0.026  0.024 
Arkansas  ­0.013  ­0.011 
California  0.013  ­0.007 
Colorado   ­0.012  0.024 
Connecticut   ­0.021  0.005 
Delaware  0.005  ­0.152 
Florida  ­0.050  0.040 
Georgia  ­0.046  0.003 
Idaho  0.010  0.009 
Illinois  ­0.003  0.000 
Indiana  ­0.030  ­0.026 
Iowa  ­0.001  ­0.001 
Kansas  ­0.022  0.008 
Kentucky  ­0.023  ­0.034 
Louisiana  0.001  ­0.037 
Maine  ­0.001  0.024 
Maryland  ­0.071  ­0.014 
Massachusetts  ­0.033  ­0.012 
Michigan  0.006  0.056 
Minnesota  ­0.047  0.016 
Mississippi  ­0.044  ­0.021 
Missouri  ­0.004  ­0.017 
Montana  ­0.061  ­0.021 
Nebraska  0.053  ­0.005 
Nevada  0.132  ­0.074 
New Hampshire  ­0.028  ­0.006 
New Jersey  ­0.045  ­0.032 
New Mexico  ­0.009  ­0.005 
New York  ­0.048  ­0.011 
North Carolina  0.040  ­0.008 
North Dakota  ­0.033  ­0.003 
Ohio  ­0.016  ­0.032 
Oklahoma  ­0.024  ­0.010 
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Oregon  ­0.022  ­0.020] 
Pennsylvania  ­0.014  ­0.019 
Rhode Island  ­0.041  ­0.048 
South Carolina  ­0.053  0.015 
South Dakota  0.067  ­0.004 
Tennessee  0.006  ­0.003 
Texas  0.009  ­0.024 
Utah  ­0.011  0.020 
Vermont  ­0.013  0.0841 
Virginia   ­0.025  ­0.016 
Washington  ­0.010  ­0.017 
West Virginia  ­0.079  ­0.070 
Wisconsin  ­0.031  ­0.015 
Wyoming  0.106  0.015 
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upil 
  
  Major School Finance Court Decisions 
1971‐1999 
1.  Classification between adequacy and equity follows sorting of West and Peterson (2007).  Cases that 
were decided on elements of both adequacy and equity were categorized as adequacy.   
 
State  Court Case (Year)  Equity or  
Adequacy?
 
 
 
Outcome:  
Reform or 
 Upheld? 
Notes 
Alabama  Alabama Coalition  
for Equity, Inc. v. 
Guy Hunt (1993) 
Mary Harper Et Al. 
v. Guy Hunt 
(1997) 
Adequacy  Reform    Lower court ruled 
education system 
unconstitutional in 
1993.  In 1997, state 
supreme court gave 
legislature one year to 
reform system. 
Arizona  Roosevelt 
Elementary School 
District No. 66 v. 
Bishop 
(1994) 
Adequacy  Reform  Finance system ruled 
unconstitutional due 
to financing of 
facilities. 
Arkansas  Dupree v. Alma 
School District No. 
30  
(1983) 
Equity Reform  before 
1990 
Led to finance 
equalization system.  
Another case tried in 
Chancery Court in the 
1990s.  
California  Serrano v. Priest 
(1971) 
Serrano v. Priest II 
(1976) 
Serrano v. Priest III
(1986) 
Equity Reform  before 
1990 
Known as the first big 
education finance 
case.  Serrano II 
called for recapturing 
revenue from wealthy 
districts to be given to 
poor districts.  
Colorado  Lujan v. Colorado 
State Board of 
Education 
(1982) 
Equity Upheld,  before 
1990 
Court ruled that 
system of financing 
education did not 
violate equity clause 
and that the 
legislature had the 
role of setting policy. 
Connecticut  Horton v. Meskill 
(1977) 
Sheff v. O’Neill 
(1996) 
Equity (Horton) 
and Adequacy 
(Sheff) 
Reform Required  a  minimum 
level of expenditures.  
Subsequent cases 
have challenged 
Horton decision, but 
the CT Supreme 
Court has upheld this 
decision.  
Delaware No  cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a Florida  Coalition for 
Adequacy and 
Fairness in School 
Funding v. Childs 
(1996) 
Adequacy  Upheld  Ruled that finance 
system did not violate 
FL constitution.  
Georgia  McDaniel v.  
Thomas 
(1981) 
Adequacy Upheld  before 
1990 
Court ruled that 
fixing school finance 
was not a judicial 
decision, but 
suggested that 
legislative action. 
Idaho  Thompson v. 
Engelking 
(1975) 
Equity Upheld,  before 
1990 
Subsequent cases in 
the 1990s called for 
reform only for 
facilities portion of 
finance.  Reform 
occurred in 2005 
following ISSEO v. 
State V. 
Illinois  Committee for 
Educational Rights 
v. Edgar 
(1996),  
Lewis E. v. 
Spagnolo 
(1999) 
Adequacy  Upheld  Court ruled that the 
legislature and not the 
judicial system should 
be involved in 
reforming school 
finance.  
Indiana Case  was 
withdrawn 
n/a n/a  n/a 
Iowa No  cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Kansas  Knowles v. State, 
(1976) 
Unified School 
District No. 229 v. 
State 
(1994) 
Equity Reform,  before 
1990 
Unified upheld 
previous reforms  
Kentucky  Rose v. Council for 
Better Education 
(1989) 
Adequacy Reform  Considered  first  big 
adequacy case.  
Called for a 
“sufficient” 
education. Louisiana  Charlet v. 
Legislature of the 
State of Louisiana 
(1998) 
Adequacy Upheld  Louisiana  Supreme 
Court ruled that state 
met the minimum 
threshold guaranteed 
through the state 
constitution.   
Maine  Maine School 
Administrative 
District (MSAD) 
No. 1 v. 
Commissioner  
(1995) 
Equity  Upheld  Court decided that 
funding did not 
violate state laws on 
equity grounds. 
Maryland  Hornbeck v. 
Somerset County 
Board of Education 
(1983) 
Equity Upheld  before 
1990 
Court rejected 
plaintiff’s equity 
claims.  
Massachusetts  McDuffy v. 
Secretary 
 (1993) 
Adequacy  Reform  MA required to fund 
difference between 
district foundation 
budget and local 
contributions for low-
wealth districts. 
Michigan  Milliken v. Green 
(1973) 
Equity   Upheld, before 
1990 
State supreme court 
found that finance 
system did not 
violate 14th 
amendment  
Minnesota  Skeen v. State 
(1993) 
Equity Upheld  Overturned  district 
court ruling that 
school finance 
violated state 
constitution 
Mississippi No  cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Missouri  Committee for 
Educational Equity 
v. State  
(1996) 
Adequacy  Reform  Circuit court case 
which called for 
legislative reform 
which was later 
upheld by state 
supreme court 
Montana  Helena Elementary 
School District No. 
1 v. State 
(1989) 
Equity Reform Legislature  responded 
by reallocating taxes Nebraska  Gould v. Orr 
(1993) 
Adequacy  Upheld  Court ruled no cause 
of action and rejected 
challenge to finance 
system 
Nevada   No cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a 
New Hampshire  Claremont School 
District I v. 
Governor 
(1993) 
Claremont II v. 
Governor 
(1997)  
Claremont III v. 
Governor 
(1999)  
Adequacy  Reform  Court ruled that 
education clause in 
state constitution 
required funding of 
an adequate education 
New Jersey  Robinson v. Cahill, 
(1973),  
Abbott v. Burke  
(5 cases, latest in 
1998) 
Equity 
(Robinson) 
Adequacy 
(Abbott) 
Reform  Abbott led to further 
revision of financing 
system on adequacy 
grounds 
New Mexico  No cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a 
New York  Board of Ed. 
Levittown v. 
Nyquist  
(1982) 
 
Reform Educational 
Financing 
Inequities  
Today (REFIT) v. 
Cuomo  
(1995) 
 
Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. 
New York 
(1995) 
 
Equity 
(Levittown and 
REFIT) 
 
Adequacy 
(Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity) 
Upheld  Ruled that New 
York’s constitution 
did not guarantee 
equal funding.  
Opened the door for 
adequacy decisions 
that came after 2000.  North Carolina  Leandro v. State 
(1997) 
Adequacy  Reform  Earlier equity case 
(Britt v. North 
Carolina, 1987) had 
been dismissed.  This 
case focused on 
adequacy.  
North Dakota  Bismarck Public 
School District No. 
1 v. State 
(1994) 
Equity Upheld  Majority  of  state 
supreme court justices 
ruled that school 
finance system was 
unconstitutional but 
fell short of required 
supermajority 
Ohio  DeRolph v. State 
(1997) 
Adequacy  Reform  Ruled state’s system 
of financing 
education was 
unconstitutional 
Oklahoma  Fair School 
Finance Council of 
Oklahoma v. State 
(1987) 
Equity Upheld  before 
1990 
Court ruled that limits 
on property taxes that 
prevented poor 
districts from raising 
funds were 
constitutional  
Oregon  Olsen v. State 
(1976),  
Coalition for  
Equitable School 
Funding v State 
(1991) 
Withers v State 
(1995) 
Equity (Olsen)  
 
Adequacy 
(Coalition) 
Upheld Upheld  funding 
system as 
constitutional 
Pennsylvania  Marrero v. 
Commonwealth 
(1997) 
Pennsylvania 
Association of 
Rural and Small 
Schools v. Casey 
(1998) 
Adequacy 
(Marrero) 
 
Equity 
(Pennsylvania 
Association) 
Upheld Dismissed  adequacy 
and equity suits. 
Rhode Island  City of Pawtucket v. 
Sundlun 
(1995) 
Adequacy  Upheld  Court ruled that 
legislature, not courts, 
were responsible for 
fixing problems with 
school finance.  South Carolina  Richland v. 
Campbell 
(1988) 
Abbeville County 
School District v. 
State 
(1999) 
Equity 
(Richland) 
 
Adequacy 
(Abbeville) 
Upheld Upheld  South 
Carolina’s school 
finance system as 
constitutional  
South Dakota  Bedzicheck v. State 
(1994) 
Adequacy  Upheld  Circuit court upheld 
constitutionality of 
finance system, 
plaintiff did not 
appeal. 
Tennessee  Tennessee Small 
School Systems v. 
McWherter 
(1993) 
Equity   Reform  Ruled that education 
system violated 
equal protection 
clause in TN 
constitution  
Texas  Edgewood 
Independent School 
District v. Kirby 
(1989) 
Equity  Reform  Found that education 
finance system 
violated education 
clause in state 
constitution  
Utah No  cases.  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Vermont  Brigham v. State 
(1997) 
Equity Reform State  ruled  school 
funding system 
unconstitutional 
Virginia  Scott v. 
Commonwealth 
(1994) 
Equity  Upheld  Court ruled that 
school finance issues 
should be handled by 
the legislature, not the 
courts 
Washington  Northshore School 
District No. 417 v. 
Kinnear  
(1974) 
Seattle School 
District No. 1 v. 
State  
(1978) 
 
Equity 
(Northshore) 
 
Adequacy 
(Seattle) 
Reform before 
1990 
Led to requirements 
of a per capita 
funding formula 
West Virginia  Pauley v. Bailey, 
(1984) 
Tomblin v. Gainer 
(1995) 
Adequacy Reform  Pauley found system 
unconstitutional, 
Tomblin led to 
decision that state still 
needed to do more  
Wisconsin  Kukor v. Grover 
(1989) 
Equity Upheld  Ruled that funding 
system did not 
violate equal 
protection and 
education clauses in 
WI constitution
Wyoming  Washakie County 
School District v. 
Herschler 
(1980) 
Campbell County 
School District v. 
State  
(1995) 
Equity 
(Washakie) 
 
Adequacy 
(Campbell) 
Reform  Ordered legislature to 
define “proper 
education” and to 
devise a formula that 
would guarantee 
funding for every 
child to receive a 
proper education. 
Sources:  
 
Fowler, William J. Jr., Catherine C. Sielke, John Dayton, C. Thomas Holmes, and Anne 
L. Jefferson.  2001.  U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education 
Statistics.  Public School Finance Programs of the United States and Canada:  1998–99.  
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Gittell, Marilyn.  1998.  The courts and equity: a state-by-state overview.  In Strategies 
for School Equity, ed. Marilyn Gittell, 70-83.  New Haven: Yale University Press.   
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Washington: National Academy Press.   
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